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QUALIFIED DOMESTIC RELATIONS ORDERS
Craig Westbrook*
The awareness of retirement plans in domestic relations actions
has increased over the past decade. As contributions to these plans in-
crease and the interest of an individual in the plan grows, it becomes
more likely to be an asset subject to division in divorce. Over this same
period, the courts have increasingly defined retirement plan benefits as
marital property.1
This article discusses the division, during divorce, of benefits dis-
tributable from qualified retirement plans of private employers. In par-
ticular, this article focuses on the Qualified Domestic Relations Order
(QDRO), which is the method enacted by Congress in 19842 for divid-
ing such benefits. A retirement plan is "qualified" if it meets the re-
quirements of section 401(a) of the Internal Revenue Code. Income
earned in a qualified plan is tax-exempt under section 501(a) of the
Code until paid to the retiree, at which time the retiree is taxed.3
Under federal law, prior to the Retirement Equity Act of 1984,'
any assignment or alienation of benefits under a qualified retirement
plan was prohibited. Along with this prohibition, section 514 of the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) pre-
empted state laws relating to pension plans.' Therefore, it was not clear
whether benefits could be paid directly to nonparticipants to meet obli-
gations for child support, separate maintenance, alimony, or property
divisions. Nevertheless, several cases arose in which the courts were
asked to determine whether the ERISA preemption and antiassignment
provisions applied to those obligations. In spite of the antiassignment
* Shareholder in Craig Westbrook, P.A., which is a partner in the Little Rock law firm of
Mitchell, Williams, Selig & Tucker. Mr. Westbrook specializes in employee benefits and is an
Adjunct Professor of Law in Deferred Compensation at UALR School of Law.
I. Young v. Young, 288 Ark. 33, 701 S.W.2d 369 (1986); Day v. Day, 281 Ark. 261, 663
S.W.2d 719 (1984); Bachman v. Bachman, 274 Ark. 23, 621 S.W.2d 701 (1981); In re Marriage
of Brown, 15 Cal. 3d 838, 544 P.2d 561, 126 Cal. Rptr. 633 (1976).
2. Retirement Equity Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-397, § 104, 98 Stat. 1426, 1433-36
(1984).
3. I.R.C. §§ 401(a), 501(a), 402 (1986).
4. I.R.C. § 401(a)(13) (1984).
5. Employment Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, § 514, 88




provision, some courts held that ERISA was not intended to preempt
state domestic relations law that permitted the attachment of benefits
to meet those obligations." Furthermore, when a participant was al-
ready receiving benefits from the plan, the Internal Revenue Service
ruled that the antiassignment provision was not violated when a plan
trustee complied with a court order requiring the distribution of the
participant's benefits to his or her spouse or children to meet the par-
ticipant's alimony or child support obligations.' The law was even less
clear as to whether benefits not currently being paid could be assigned
for future payment. There was virtually no authority on this question
and no guidance concerning the taxability of such payments.
The Retirement Equity Act of 1984 generally applies to employee
pension benefit plans that are subject to ERISA. Therefore, the Act
does not apply to government plans8 or to Individual Retirement Ac-
counts.9 It would apply, however, to private employer plans.
The Act was adopted to answer many of the questions concerning
the antiassignment problem. The Act amended section 401(a)(13) of
the Internal Revenue Code by providing that payments to a spouse or
child under a QDRO do not violate the antiassignment provision, and
that payments under a domestic relations order that is not a QDRO do
violate the antiassignment provision.10 The Act has two primary results:
(1) it provides a method for direct payment of benefits awarded from
the plan to a nonemployee spouse; and (2) it clarifies the tax treatment
of payments from the plan upon divorce. The Act does not answer the
question of what is marital property. This is still a question of state
law. The Act merely governs the form and timing of payment of bene-
fits and addresses the question of whether the participant's spouse or
dependents may be assigned benefits under the plan. The method for
6. Cody v. Riecker, 594 F.2d 314 (2d Cir. 1979); American Tel. and Tel. Co. v. Merry, 592
F.2d 118 (2d Cir. 1979); Kikkert v. Kikkert, 177 N.J. Super. 471, 427 A.2d 76 (App. Div. 1981).
7. Rev. Rul. 80-27, 1980-1 C.B. 85.
8. The Retirement Equity Act amends ERISA § 206(d), which pertains to assignments of
benefits. Part 2 of ERISA, which includes § 206, does not apply to government plans. ERISA §
4(b) and § 201. Government plans generally have special provisions concerning divorce. See, e.g.,
5 U.S.C. § 8345 (1982 & Supp. III 1985) (civil service retirement benefits); 10 U.S.C. § 1408
(1982 & Supp. III 1985) (military retirement benefits); 45 U.S.C. § 231 (1982 & Supp. 111 1985)
(railroad retirement benefits); and 42 U.S.C. § 402 (1982 & Supp. i1 1985) (social security
benefits).
9. Section 201 of ERISA exempts Individual Retirement Accounts (IRA) from Part 2 of
ERISA. However, § 408(d)(6) of the Code contains a method for transferring an individual's IRA
upon divorce.




division of benefits under the Retirement Equity Act is the QDRO.
The new QDRO rules are set out in section 414(p) of the Code.1"
A QDRO is a domestic relations order that (1) creates or recog-
nizes the existence of an "alternate payee's" rights, or assigns to an
"alternate payee" the right to receive all or a portion of the benefits
payable to a participant under a qualified plan, and (2) meets certain
other requirements as discussed below.'" A domestic relations order is a
judgment, decree or order (including a court-approved property settle-
ment agreement) that relates to the payment of benefits to a child,
spouse (present or former), or other dependent of a participant pursu-
ant to state domestic relations law."3 A property settlement agreement
that has not been approved by a court is not a domestic relations order.
The "alternate payee" is the spouse, former spouse, child, or other de-
pendent who is recognized under the order as having a right to receive
all or a portion of the participant's benefits.
14
By amending section 401(a)(13) of the Code, the Retirement Eq-
uity Act makes clear that any assignment of a plan benefit violates the
antiassignment rule and could disqualify the plan, unless the assign-
ment is pursuant to a QDRO.'6 Under the Act, the QDRO is the sole
means of attaching retirement plan benefits. Moreover, since it is clear
that federal law allows payments from a plan under a QDRO, the plan
may be required by a state court to recognize valid QDROs. This does
not mean that a state court cannot divide retirement plan benefits
under an order that is not a QDRO; it merely means that the spouse
must look to the employee, not the plan, for payment.
In addition to being a domestic relations order, a QDRO must
meet the following requirements:
1. The order must specifically state each retirement plan to which
it applies, and it is advisable to refer to the proper name of the plan. 6
A statement that refers to "each pension or profit sharing plan of the
employer in which the employee participates" is unsatisfactory.
2. The order must clearly specify:
a. The name and last known mailing address (if any) of the
participant and the name and last known mailing address (if any) of
II. I.R.C. § 414 (p) (1986).
12. I.R.C. § 414(p)(I)(A) (1986).
13. I.R.C. § 414(p)(l)(B) (1986).
14. I.R.C. § 4 14 (p)(8) (1986).
15. I.R.C. § 401(a)(13) (1986), as amended by The Retirement Equity Act of 1984, supra
note 2.
16. I.R.C. § 414(p)(2)(D) (1986).
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each alternate payee.1" The order meets this test if the plan administra-
tor has reason to know the address of the participant or alternate payee
independently of the order, such as where the alternate payee is a par-
ticipant and the plan records include a plan address. 18
b. The amount or percentage of the participant's benefits the
plan will pay to each alternate payee, or the manner in which this is to
be determined. The alternate payee's rights are still governed by state
law. For example, the amount to which the alternate payee is entitled
may be limited by state law to benefits accrued during marriage. 9 Sec-
tion 414(p) requires only that the amount be clearly stated. In any
event, one should try to avoid the possibility that the QDRO provides
for a greater benefit than the participant will be entitled to.
c. The number of payments or period to which the order ap-
plies.2 0 This could be payments for an undetermined period (such as
the alternate payee's life), a fixed number of payments, or payment
over the recipient's life expectancy.
3. The order may not require the plan to provide any type or form
of benefit, or any option, not otherwise allowed under the plan.2 ' To
meet this requirement, the attorney for the nonemployee spouse must
obtain a copy of the most recent version of the plan that has been
amended to comply with the Retirement Equity Act.
The order can select a specific form of benefit or allow the alter-
nate payee to select the form.22 The alternate payee should be given
discretion because his or her circumstances may change prior to com-
mencement of payment .2  Even though the court could retain jurisdic-
17. I.R.C. § 414(p)(2)(A) (1986).
18. S. REP. No. 575, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 20, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEws 2547 [hereinafter SENATE REPORT].
19. See Marshall v. Marshall, 271 Ark. 116, 607 S.W.2d 90 (Ark. Ct. App. 1980); Harris,
The Arkansas Marital Property Statutes and the Arkansas Appellate Courts: Tiptoeing To-
gether Through the Tulips, 7 UALR L.J. 1, 15-22 (1984).
20. I.R.C. § 414(p)(2)(B) and (C) (1986).
21. I.R.C. § 414(p)(3)(A) (1986); Cummings v. Briggs & Stratton Retirement Plan, 797
F.2d 383 (7th Cir. 1986).
22. Although many plans contain a provision for the plan administrator, not the participant
or beneficiary, to select the form of benefit, this will soon change. The Treasury has issued Pro-
posed Regulations that state that the participant must be allowed to select the form of benefit.
Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.401(a)-4 (Q & A-3), 51 Fed. Reg. 3800 (1986).
23. The S. REP. No. 313, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 1105 to the Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L.
No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085, which was adopted into the H.R. CONF. REP. No. 841, 99th Cong., 2d
Sess. 857, states in the technical corrections to the Retirement Equity Act that an order will not
fail to be a QDRO even if the form of benefit in the order is subsequently eliminated from the
plan. If the QDRO's benefit is eliminated by plan amendment, the alternate payee could either
receive the form specified in the QDRO or elect another allowed form (as long as the participant's
benefits are not affected).
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tion to amend the order, it is better to eliminate this possibility.
There has been some question as to whether a QDRO may require
that benefits be paid to the spouse in the form of an annuity for the
spouse's, rather than the participant's life, or even a joint and survivor
annuity for the lives of the alternate payee and his or her subsequent
spouse. Section 414(p)(4), as corrected by the Tax Reform Act of
1986, now makes it clear that a QDRO may provide for any form of
benefit, including an annuity, except for a joint and survivor annuity
for the alternate payee and a subsequent spouse.2'
4. The order may not require that a plan provide increased benefits
(determined on the basis of actuarial value).28 The legislative history of
the Retirement Equity Act indicates that an order does not violate this
requirement as long as the benefits payable under the order are equal
to or less than the actuarial value of the benefits to which the partici-
pant would have been entitled in the absence of the order.2" Actuarial
value is to be determined under the plan.
5. A QDRO must be consistent with all other QDROs received by
the plan with respect to the participant.2 7 The QDRO will take priority
over a subsequent spouse's survivor benefits on a "first-come-first-
serve" basis. The priority should be determined by the dates the orders
were determined to be QDROs, not the dates of the orders themselves.
The most difficult question concerning a QDRO is whether the
benefits payable to the alternate payee must terminate upon the death
of the participant or upon the death of the alternate payee. Once the
alternate payee begins receiving benefits, he or she should be able to
select a form of benefit that does not terminate upon either the partici-
pant's or alternate payee's death. For example, an alternate payee
could elect to receive an annuity with a number of years certain, an
installment payment, or a lump sum payment. The options that are
available will depend on the provisions in the plan.
When benefits are not yet distributable, the Retirement Equity
Act is not clear. If the participant dies before payments begin, the
death benefits would be payable to the alternate payee to the extent
that the alternate payee is designated as the participant's beneficiary.
Even then, the participant could change the beneficiary designation.
Although the alternate payee would have a cause of action against the
participant if the beneficiary designation is changed, the plan could not
24. I.R.C. § 414(p)(4)(A)(iii) (1986).
25. I.R.C. § 414(p)(3)(B) (1986).
26. SENATE REPORT, supra note 18.
27. I.R.C. § 414(p)(3)(C) (1986).
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be forced to pay benefits to the alternate payee.
Moreover, some defined benefit plans provide only for the mini-
mum death benefit required by law, that is, an annuity for the life of
the surviving spouse28 of the participant. In such a plan, an unmarried
participant has no death benefit. If the participant dies before retiring,
the alternate payee/former spouse would not be entitled to any benefit.
The answer to these problems is to designate in the QDRO that
the former spouse will be treated as the surviving spouse, which section
414(p)(5) of the Code allows. This accomplishes two purposes. First,
when there would otherwise be no death benefit for the participant and
therefore no survivor benefit for the alternate payee, the alternate
payee would receive an annuity for his or her life. It is possible that
after the participant's death, the plan may allow the spouse to waive
the annuity and elect to receive an amount equal to the value of the
annuity in a lump sum, in installments, or in any other form permissi-
ble under the plan.29 Second, if the former spouse is treated as the
surviving spouse, the participant cannot change his beneficiary designa-
tion without his former spouse's consent.
A provision in the QDRO designating the former spouse as spouse
may be inadequate from the standpoint of the alternate payee. First,
the designation protects only spouses, not children or other alternate
payees. Second, the designation is permissive. If the order does not pro-
vide that the former spouse be treated as the surviving spouse, and the
participant dies before the former spouse begins receiving benefits
under the order, the former spouse will not receive benefits under sec-
tion 414(p)(5).
From the standpoint of the participant, this designation has other
undesirable consequences. For example, a participant may not borrow
money from a pension plan and pledge his interest therein without his
spouse's consent.30 Moreover, the former spouse may defeat any rights
of the participant's second spouse. The solution may be to designate the
former spouse as surviving spouse under section 414(p)(5) only as to
the portion of the benefit that is to be paid to the former spouse as
alternate payee. However, whether this would qualify in a QDRO may
vary among plan administrators.
If the alternate payee dies before the participant and before pay-
ments begin, there is some question as to whether the alternate payee
28. I.R.C. § 417(c) (1986).
29. I.R.C. § 417(e)(2) (1986).




may designate a beneficiary of his or her portion of the benefits. Some
plan administrators maintain that the alternative payee has no right to
designate a beneficiary since the alternate payee is considered a "bene-
ficiary" under the Act. 31 Since few plans give authority for a benefi-
ciary to designate a beneficiary, such a designation would be in viola-
tion of the plan's terms. The safest approach is to provide in the order
that the participant shall designate the alternate payee's primary bene-
ficiary as the participant's contingent beneficiary (with respect to the
alternate payee's portion of the benefits). At least this should prevent
the participant from receiving a windfall. Whether a plan administra-
tor will accept this provision will vary from plan to plan.
An alternate payee should be prepared, however, for the plan ad-
ministrator to take the position that the alternate payee (or his or her
beneficiary) is never entitled to benefits in the event of the death of the
participant or the alternate payee, unless section 414(p)(5) applies or
the alternate payee actually begins receiving benefits prior to the par-
ticipant's or alternate payee's death. Since the plan could be disquali-
fied if it pays benefits under an order that is not a QDRO, plan admin-
istrators will probably be conservative pending a determination of this
question.
Another issue that must be addressed in the QDRO is the timing
of payment of benefits to the alternate payee. Ordinarily, the QDRO
may not require payment of benefits prior to the date on which the
participant begins receiving benefits, or at least reaches normal retire-
ment age under the plan. However, a QDRO may require that pay-
ments to the alternate payee begin on or after the date on which the
participant attains the "earliest retirement age" under the plan,
whether or not the participant actually retires on that date."
The earliest retirement date is the earlier of (1) the date on which
the participant is entitled to a distribution, or (2) the later of (i) the
date the participant reaches age fifty or (ii) the earliest date the par-
ticipant could begin receiving benefits if he or she separated from ser-
vice. 3 For example, if the plan provides for withdrawals by the partici-
pant while employed, the former spouse should be entitled to an
immediate distribution. However, if only nondeductible employee con-
31. ERISA § 206(d)(3)(J) (1974) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1056 (1982 and
Supp. 111 1985)), as added by the Retirement Equity Act of 1984, supra note 2.
32. I.R.C. § 414(p)(4) (1986). According to the Conference Report in the Tax Reform Act
of 1986, a plan may provide for payment to the alternate payee earlier than the earliest retirement
date. The QDRO cannot provide for such payment in absence of a plan provision.
33. I.R.C. § 414(p)(4)(B) (1986), as amended by the Tax Reform Act of 1986, supra note
23, at § 1898(c)(7)(vii) (1986).
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tributions may be withdrawn without separation from service, the alter-
nate payee would only be allowed to receive the nondeductible em-
ployee contributions under this rule. If no withdrawals are allowed, but
the plan provides that immediate distributions will be made to termi-
nated participants, and the participant is age forty, the earliest retire-
ment date would be age fifty. The alternate payee should review the
document for features that determine the earliest retirement age and
when the plan allows withdrawals.
If benefits are to be paid to the alternate payee on or after the
earliest retirement age but before the participant reaches normal retire-
ment age, the order can consider only benefits actually accrued as of
that date as if the participant had terminated on that date."' In a de-
fined contribution plan, this would be the account balance as of the
benefit commencement date.
When the participant has not yet separated from service or
reached the earliest retirement age, a QDRO may not require payment
of benefits to the alternate payee in absence of a plan provision author-
izing such a distribution. This may prevent a lump-sum settlement be-
tween parties at the time of the divorce. However, an earlier distribu-
tion from a profit sharing plan may be possible if the plan allows in-
service withdrawals by the participant.s" Again, it would be important
to review the plan for such a provision.
Procedures
The plan document is not required to contain provisions concern-
ing QDROs.36 However, the plan administrator is required to establish
34. I.R.C. § 414(p)(4)(A)(iii) (1986). The maximum amount that can be paid to the alter-
nate payee beginning on this date is calculated by using the participant's normal retirement bene-
fit, accrued as of the date payout begins, and by actuarially reducing such benefit based on the
interest rate specified in the plan. A plan that provides for early distribution under this rule will
not be considered to be in violation of other provisions concerning in-service distributions from a
pension plan or a 401(k) plan. I.R.C. § 414(p)(5) (1986). In determining the amount of benefit,
any "early retirement subsidy" cannot be considered. In other words, if the participant would
receive more benefits if he qualified for early retirement and retired on a particular date than if he
merely terminated employment on a particular date, the difference cannot be taken into account.
If an alternate payee begins receiving benefits under the order, and the participant subsequently
retires with the increased retirement benefits, the order may specify that the amount payable to
the alternate payee is to be recalculated. In this manner, the alternate payee also receives a share
of this increased benefit to which the participant is entitled. This recalculation is not considered to
violate the prohibition against a QDRO providing for increased benefits. SENATE REPORT, supra
note 18, at 21.
35. I.R.C. § 414(p)(4)(B) (1986), as amended by the Tax Reform Act of 1986, supra note
23, at § 1898(c)(7)(vii) (1986) and text accompanying note 33.
36. Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.401(a)-13T(b) (1986).
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procedures it can use to determine whether an order is a QDRO.3 7
Upon receipt of an order, the plan administrator must promptly
notify the participant and each alternate payee by mailing notice of
such receipt and copies of the plan administrator's procedures to
them.88 The plan administrator must determine whether the order is a
QDRO within a reasonable time after receipt, as defined in regulations
to be prescribed by the Secretary of Labor. The plan administrator
must then notify the participant and each alternate payee of its deter-
mination. 9 If the determination is negative, the parties should correct
the order so that it can qualify as a QDRO. Generally, the notice will
contain the reasons for the denial.
Upon receipt of an order, the plan administrator must separately
account for the amounts that would have been payable to the alternate
payee had the order been immediately determined to be a QDRO.4 0 If,
within eighteen months after the deferral of benefits, the order is deter-
mined to be a QDRO, the plan administrator must pay the segregated
amounts (plus any interest thereon) to the individuals entitled
thereto.41 If within eighteen months the order is determined not to be a
QDRO, or, if for some reason there is no determination, the plan ad-
ministrator must pay the segregated amounts to the person who would
otherwise be entitled to them. If that person has not yet begun receiv-
ing benefits, the amounts must be paid back into the plan.42 After this
eighteen-month period, if a subsequent determination is made that the
order is a QDRO, it will apply prospectively only.43
If the plan administrator has erroneously determined that the or-
der is not a QDRO, the alternate payee, as a beneficiary, could bring
an action in federal court against the plan administrator under ERISA
section 502. 44 Even if the order is determined not to be a QDRO, the
37. I.R.C. § 414(p)(6)(B) (1986). The Internal Revenue Service will not rule on whether an
order is a QDRO. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 85-38-063 (June 25, 1985).
38. I.R.C. § 414(p)(6)(A)(i) (1986).
39. I.R.C. § 414(p)(6)(A)(ii) (1986).
40. I.R.C. § 414(p)(7)(A) (1986).
41. I.R.C.§ 414(p)(7) (1986). Under the technical corrections provisions, the 18-month pe-
riod is clarified to begin on the date the first payment would be required under the order. Tax
Reform Act of 1986, supra note 23, at § 1898(c)(2).
42. I.R.C. § 414(p)(7) (1986).
43. I.R.C.§ 414(p)(7)(D) (1986).
44. ERISA § 206(d)(3)(J) (1974) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1056 (1982 and
Supp. !11 1985)) as added by the Retirement Equity Act of 1984, states that the alternate payee
will be considered a beneficiary for purposes of ERISA. Of course, if the plan administrator deter-
mines that the order is not a QDRO, the spouse is not an alternate payee, and theoretically could




spouse may have a cause of action against the participant. For exam-
ple, if an order is determined to be qualified after the eighteen-month
period, the alternate payee may have a cause of action against the par-
ticipant for amounts paid to the participant that should have been paid
to the alternate payee.
Once an order is determined to be a QDRO, the alternate payee is
entitled to any notices, such as summary annual reports, summary plan
descriptions, and benefit statements, as are any beneficiaries under
ERISA."
The Tax Reform Act of 1986 provides that payment of benefits
under a QDRO is not a garnishment for purposes of federal or state
restrictions on garnishment."
The Retirement Equity Act also establishes the tax treatment of
distributions under a QDRO. If the alternate payee is the former
spouse, the alternate payee will be taxed on any distributions made to
him or her.47 In addition, payments to the alternate payee before the
participant is fifty-nine and one-half years of age are not subject to the
ten percent additional income tax that might otherwise apply under
certain circumstances." The exemption from the pre fifty-nine and
one-half age penalty does not apply once the alternate payee rolls the
distribution into an individual retirement account. If the alternate
payee is not the former spouse, but is a child or other dependent, the
participant will be taxed on the distributions even though they are
made to the alternate payee.49
If the participant has a basis in his benefit as a result of making
nondeductible contributions, this basis, called the "investment in the
contract," will be allocated between the participant and the alternate
payee on the basis of present value.50 The rules concerning taxation of
45. ERISA §§ 104 and 105 (1974).
46. ERISA § 206(d)(3)(M) (1974), added by the Tax Reform Act of 1986, supra note 23,
at § 1898(c)(5).
47. i.R.C. § 402(a)(9) (1986). Also, any attorney representing the participant should con-
sider including an indemnification provision that sets forth the intended taxability to the spouse
and indemnification to the participant should the participant be required to pay taxes on any
distribution to the alternate payee. The participant will be taxable on any benefits under an order
that is not a QDRO.
48. SENATE REPORT, supra, note 18 at 23. I.R.C. § 72(t)(2)(D) (1986), as added by the Tax
Reform Act of 1986, supra note 23, at 1123(a).
49. I.R.C. § 402(a)(9) (1986), added by the Tax Reform Act of 1986, supra note 23, at §
1898(c)(1). For payments prior to enactment of the Tax Reform Act of 1986, the alternate payee
was taxable even though not the former spouse.
50. I.R.C. § 72(m)(10) (1986); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 85-11-099 (Dec. 21, 1984). Under the techni-
cal corrections, only the spouse or former spouse is allocated any basis.
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annuities under section 72 otherwise apply.51
Finally, the Code provides that ten-year averaging (or five-year
averaging under the Tax Reform Act of 1986) treatment for a lump-
sum distribution is not available to an alternate payee.52 However, any
part of a lump-sum distribution to the alternate payee may be rolled
over, tax free, to an individual retirement account." Moreover, just be-
cause amounts are payable to an alternate payee does not disqualify
the participant from receiving a lump-sum distribution."
Effective Dates
The provision concerning QDROs was effective January 1, 1985.
To the extent that payments to an alternate payee were already being
made prior to that date, the plan administrator is required to treat the
order as a QDRO. In addition, a plan administrator may treat any
other order entered before January 1, 1985, as a QDRO.' The legisla-
tive history states that "the committee encourages plan administrators
to treat an existing order as qualified to the extent it is consistent with
the provisions of the bill."" Thus, orders entered prior to January,
1985, may still be considered as QDROs if distributions have not yet
commenced.
Conclusion
Although the Retirement Equity Act has been in effect since Janu-
ary 1, 1985, QDROs are still not widely used. There are two reasons
for this. First, in many divorces the costs of preparing QDRO provi-
sions are unacceptable to the parties. This is particularly true when, as
is usually the case, the spouse will not receive any benefits until years
later, and even then payment may still be speculative. Second, trial
judges have, justifiably, stated that the marriage relationship should be
completely and permanently severed. A QDRO (or any other division
51. A portion of each payment is taxable to the alternate payee under I.R.C. § 72 (1986).
52. I.R.C. § 402(e)(4)(M) (1986). Where the parties are agreeable and a lump-sum distri-
bution can be made, the participant could receive a distribution, elect special averaging, pay the
lower tax, and pay the alternate payee the balance.
53. I.R.C. § 402(a)(6)(F) (1986) provides for rollover upon receipt of the alternate payee's
entire balance. Apparently, an alternate payee may not roll over the funds if less than the entire
balance to his or her credit is distributed. A participant, on the other hand, may roll over a partial
distribution under § 401(a)(5)(D).
54. I.R.C. § 402(e)(4)(M) (1986).
55. Retirement Equity Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-347 § 303(d), 98 Stat. 1426, 1453
(1984); In re Marriage of Williams, 163 Cal. App. 3d 753, 209 Cal. Rptr. 827 (1985).
56. SENATE REPORT, supra note 18, at 23.
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of retirement benefits) may unnecessarily tie the parties together.
Nevertheless, there are many situations in which a QDRO is nec-
essary and desirable. It is not unusual for professionals or executives to
accumulate several hundred thousand dollars in qualified plans. How-
ever, these accumulations are not limited to highly-paid individuals.
The following is an example of an individual other than someone
highly-paid, who may be a candidate for a QDRO:
Harold, 48, and Mary, 47, have been married for 20 years. Har-
old has worked at XYZ Company, a local manufacturer, for the last
20 years, and makes $35,000 per year. Harold is covered by his com-
pany's retirement plan and for the last eight years Harold has partici-
pated in a savings plan in which his employer matches his own contri-
butions. Harold has $25,000 in the savings plan. Because of Harold's
age, his current vested "accrued benefit" in the company retirement
plan might easily be valued in excess of $50,000. In many situations,
the parties will not have enough other assets which can or should be
offset against these assets, which total at least $75,000.
It is impossible to predict the "right" situation in which to use a
QDRO. However, an attorney should always inquire concerning retire-
ment benefits. Even if a QDRO is not used, the value of the employee-
spouse's retirement benefits may give the nonemployee spouse a larger
current settlement.
The QDRO provision is extremely technical, burdensome to plan
administrators, and needs clarification, particularly concerning death
benefits. Nevertheless, section 414(p) adds some certainty in the ability
of a spouse or child to receive retirement benefits directly from the plan
rather than the participant. With all of the problems in collecting ali-
mony and child support, this is a relief to those representing alternate
payees. Although the practice of severing the marriage relationships
will be continued, the QDRO (particularly when improved by regula-
tions) should be an effective means of dividing retirement benefits when
necessary. It is a provision with which family law practitioners must
become familiar if they are to adequately represent their clients.
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